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Conclusion
The position which the New York Court of Appeals will take if
this question comes before it is highly speculative. True, the Appellate Division of the Third Department held in the Martin case that
there could be no conviction, but the court did not write an opinion
and rested its decision on three cases which do not even contain dicta
on the point. The writer feels, however, that if the question does
reach the Court of Appeals, that court should hold in favor of the
spouse's immunity. This conclusion is not the result of a belief that such a holding would greatly aid in preserving the unity of
the family, but is predicated upon the firm conviction that penal laws
should be written so that the layman can fully understand them. They
should be expressed in clear, unmistakable terms, and should not be
implied from words of doubtful meaning. Personal liberty is too
precious to be destroyed by subtleties of legal reasoning. Where the
law has become obscure because of conflicting decisions it is the duty
of the legislature to take the initiative and restate or clarify it.
ANDREW

J.

GRAHAM.

THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 295(L) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE TO THE DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY

The defense of alibi is the defense 1 that at the time the crime
charged was committed the accused was at another place. 2 The literal
meaning of the term alibi being "elsewhere", 3 the potency of alibi as
a defense is derived from the impossibility of the guilt of the accused,
because of physical circumstances. 4 Impossibility of the defendant's
presence in the place and at the time involved is the essential feature
of this defense 5 and any proof whose tendency it is to show that it
was reasonably impossible for the accused to have been present at the
time and place of the commission of the offense charged, is sufficient
1 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 505 ("The defense of alibi
is not, properly speaking, a defense within any accurate meaning of the word
defense, but is a mere fact shown in rebuttal of the evidence introduced by
the State. The corpus delicti is not denied by the claim of alibi, its only design
is to prove that the defendant, being in another place at the time, could not
have committed the offense charged").
2 Dees v. State, 99 Fla. 1144, 128 So. 485 (1930); Huckett v. State, 121
Neb. 36, 237 N. W. 159 (1931).
8 Azbill v. State, 19 Ariz. 499, 172 Pac. 658 (1918).
4 Singh v. State, 35 Ariz. 432, 280 Pac. 672, 67 A. L. R. 129 (1929) ; Harris
v. State, 120 Ga. 167, 47 S. E. 520 (1923).
5 Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 51 S.E. 322 (1905).
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to establish the defense. 6 The rule is well settled that the defense of
alibi, to be effective, must be proved by such evidence and to such a
degree of certainty as will, when the whole evidence is considered,
create and leave in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt 7 of the
guilt of the accused.8 The accused is not required to prove impossibility of presence beyond a reasonable doubt, 9 or even in most jurisdictions by a preponderance of the evidence.' 0 It is sufficient if established to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury.I It is not necessary2
that the jury should be absolutely convinced of the truth of the alibi '
but it is enough to require an acquittal that the evidence taken as a
whole, whether adduced by the prosecution or by accused is sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt generally.' 3 Thus, if there
is a reasonable doubt of the defendant's presence at the scene of the
alleged crime at the time of its commission, arising upon all the evidence, the jury should acquit; and this reasonable doubt may arise
6 Blanchard, J. in State v. Ardoin, 49 La. Ann. 1145, 22 So. 620 (1897),

said, "The rule of law, as applicable to the defense of alibi does not require the

defendant to reasonably satisfy the jury of his exact whereabouts every moment
of the time necessary to cover the period when the offense was committed, it is
only necessary to show such a state of facts or circumstances as to reasonably
satisfy the jury that the defendant was elsewhere than at the place where, and
at the moment when, the offense was committed."; Smith v. State, 3 Ga. App.
803, 61 S. E. 737 (1907).
7 "A reasonable doubt is such a doubt as would make a man of ordinary
prudence, sensibility and decision, in determining an issue of like concern to
himself, pause or hesitate in arriving at his conclusion." United States v.
McHugh, 253 Fed. 224 (1917).
8 Blakes v. State, 133 Fla. 12, 182 So. 447 (1938); State v. Sheehan, 33
Idaho 553, 196 Pac. 532 (1921) ; People v. Le Mar, 358 Ill. 58, 192 N. E. 703
(1934); People v. Robinson, 308 Ill.398, 139 N. E. 599 (1923); Draper v.
Commonwealth, 132 Va. 648, 111 S. E. 471 (1922).
9 People v. Fong, 58 Cal. App. 675, 208 Pac. 1101 (1922) ; Blakes v. State,
133 Fla. 12, 182 So. 447 (1938); Green v. State, 154 Ga. 394, 114 S. E. 361
(1922); People v. Oswald, 340 Ill. 434, 172 N. E. 819 (1930); State v. Hayes,
301 Mo. 304, 256 S. W. 747 (1923); People v. Elmore, 277 N. Y. 397, 14
N. E. (2d) 451 (1938).
10 People v. Fong, 58 Cal. App. 675, 208 Pac. 1101 (1922); State v.
Sheehan, 33 Idaho 553, 196 Pac. 532 (1921); Beck v. State, 51 Neb. 106, 70
N. W. 498 (1897); State v. Milosevich, 119 Ore. 404, 249 Pac. 625 (1926);
Draper v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 648, 111 S. E. 471 (1922).
11 Dean v. State, 154 Ga. 533, 114 S. E. 809 (1922) ; Moss v. State, 43 Ga.
App. 109, 158 S. E. 461 (1931) ; 16 C. J. 777, n.89.
12 People v. Ahrling, 279 Ill.70, 116 N. E. 764 (1917). In People v.
Marvill, 236 Mich. 595, 211 N. W. 23 (1926), Wiest, J. said, "Testimony in
support of an alibi may accomplish no more than the raising of a reasonable
doubt as to the sufficiency of the proofs connecting an accused with the crime
alleged or render such proofs unsatisfactory. If the testimony relative to an
alibi serves such purpose, it creates a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of an
accused. In other words an alibi may fail as a substantive defense and yet
serve to raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of an accused."
13 Williams v. State, 21 Ala. App. 319, 108 So. 34 (1926) ; People v. Quinn,
111 Cal. App. 614, 295 Pac. 1042 (1931); Green v. State, 154 Ga. 394, 114
S. E. 361 (1922); People v. Barbato, 254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E. 458 (1931);
People v. Elmore, 277 N. Y. 397, 14 N. E. (2d) 451 (1938); State v. Milosevich, 119 Ore. 404, 249 Pac. 625 (1920).
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from lack of evidence of the defendant's presence at the time and place
in question 1 4 or from evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
he was then at another place. 15 The defendant is entitled to have such
defense fairly treated without disparagement
16 and the jury properly
17
thereof.
law
the
to
as
instructed
The court has a right to look at the facts clearly shown in the
case and to judge as to whether or not there is any likelihood or possibility of the truthfulness of the evidence of alibi.' 8 As a general
rule an instruction on the defense of alibi is proper and sufficient
which states the elements constituting the defense 19 and also charges
that if the evidence of an alibi in connection with all the other evidence
raises a reasonable doubt of the presence of the accused at the time
and place of the crime, he should be given the benefit of such doubt
and be acquitted. 20 The instruction to the jury should contain a
charge as to the burden of adducing the evidence to prove the defense
of alibi being on the defendant.2 ' Where the crime alleged involves
the presence of the accused at the time of its commission, the burden
of proof rests primarily on the prosecution to show the fact beyond
a reasonable doubt. 22 But once the prosecution makes a prima facie
14 Where evidence has been given on behalf of defendant to prove an alibi,
the prosecution is entitled to offer rebutting evidence to prove his presence.
Smith v. People, 39 Colo. 202, 88 Pac. 1072 (1907) ; People v. Scott, 261 Ill.
165, 103 N. E. 617 (1913); State v. Gulliver, 163 Iowa 123, 142 N. W. 948
(1913) ; State v. Shuford, 152 N. C. 809, 67 S. E. 923 (1910).
15 Falgout v. United States, 279 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923) ; Graham v.
State, 153 Ala. 38, 45 So. 480 (1908); People v. Fong, 58 Cal. App. 675, 208
Pac. 1101 (1922) ; State v. Sheehan, 33 Idaho 553, 196 Pac. 532 (1921) ; People
v. Robinson, 308 Ill. 398, 139 N. E. 599 (1923); People v. Rush, 107 Mich. 251,
65 N. W. 99 (1895); People v. Stone, 117 N. Y. 480, 23 N. E. 13 (1889);
State v. Latimer, 88 S. C. 79, 70 S. E. 409 (1911) ; People v. Kessler, 13 Utah
69, 44 Pac. 97 (1896); Draper v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 648, 111 S. E. 471
(1922).
Is People v. Lattimore, 86 Cal. 403, 24 Pac. 1091 (1890); Sheehan v.
People, 131 Ill.
22, 22 N. E. 818 (1889) ; State v. Smalls, 98 S. C. 297, 82 S. E.
421 (1914) ; Lanphere v. State, 114 Wis. 193, 89 N. W. 128 (1902).
17 State v. Standley, 76 Iowa 215, 40 N. W. 815 (1888) ; State v. Johnson,
40 Kan. 266, 19 Pac. 749 (1888) ; State v. Bruton, 253 Mo. 361, 161 S. W. 751
(1913); State v. King, 50 Wash. 312, 97 Pac. 247 (1908).
IsJones v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 177, 20 S. W. 354 (1892) ; Shetters v. State,
66 Tex. Cr. 478, 147 S. W. 582 (1912).
19 State v. Powers, 72 Vt. 168, 47 Atl. 830 (1900). In State v. Jones, 153
Mo. 457, 55 S. W. 80 (1900), it was said that while it was better to use plain
English words in an instruction instead of the word "alibi", yet, where it
appears from the instruction as a whole that it was understood by the jury, the
use of such word produces no injury.
20 State v. Johnson, 40 Kan. 266, 19 Pac. 749 (1888) ; State v. Jones, 153
Mo. 457, 55 S. W. 80 (1900) ; State v. Tapack, 78 N. J. L. 208, 72 At. 962
(1909) ; State v. Nelson, 17 N. D. 13, 114 N. W. 478 (1908); State v. Anderson, 59 S. C. 229, 37 S. E. 820 (1901); Legere v. State, 111 Tenn. 368, 77
S. W. 1059 (1903).
21 Field v. State, 126 Ga. 571, 55 S. E. 502 (1906) ; State v. Thornton, 10
S. D. 349, 73 N. W. 196 (1897) ; State v. Hier, 78 Vt 488, 63 Atl. 877 (1906).
22 People v. Nelson, 85 Cal. 421, 24 Pac. 1006 (1890) ; State v. Bosworth,
170 Iowa 329, 152 N. W. 581 (1915) ; State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl. 483
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case of the accused's presence, the burden devolves on the accused,
if he relies on an alibi, to adduce evidence to defeat the state's prima
facie case or establish his defense. 23 It has been held that it is error
to charge that the defense of alibi must be made out beyond a reasonable doubt, 24 or by a preponderance of the evidence, 25 or that evidence
thereof must be of strong convincing character and must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis except the non-presence of the defendant, 26 or
that such defense must2 be fully and satisfactorily established to the
satisfaction of the jury.
With the law in this condition, the criminal courts were filled
with cases in which there was a sudden appearance of witnesses to
prove that the accused was not at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission and thus creating a reasonable doubt about the testimony of the state's witnesses. 28 Perjured "alibi" witnesses were
brought into court at the eleventh hour and at a time which, in practice, affords the prosecution no opportunity to check either the credibility of the witnesses nor the accuracy of their statements.29 To remedy this evil, the Committee on Criminal Courts and Procedure of the
(1889).

In State v. Bosworth, 170 Iowa 379, 152 N. W. 581 (1915), it was

said, "The defense of alibi which casts certain burdens upon the defendant, is
an affirmative defense which asserts that distance made it impossible to commit
the crime. It is none too clear what is meant by the rule which puts the burden
as to alibi on the defendant and makes his testimony on alibi available in aid
of creating a reasonable doubt which if entertained effects a holding that the
state has not met its burdens. A denial that defendant participated leaves the

burden on the state. If coupled with the denial, there be a claim that the
evidence shows defendant was too far away to have participated, an acquittal
can be had upon that affirmative defense alone, but only if defendant proves
such defense.
23 People v. Connors, 253 Ill. 266, 97 N. E. 643 (1912) ; State v. Flood,
148 Iowa 146, 127 N. W. 48 (1910).
The credibility of testimony showing an alibi is for the jury. Jordan v.
State, 18 Ga. A. 44, 88 S. E. 825 (1916). Accordingly where the evidence will
sustain a verdict of guilty, the jury may disregard the alibi testimony although
the latter is complete and covers the whole time during which the alleged crime
was committed. Droak v. State, 43 S. W. 988 (1898). However, the defense
of an alibi is as legitimate as any other and the witnesses who testify to it are
entitled to like credit with others. People v. Hare, 57 Mich. 505, 24 N. W. 843

(1885).

24 State v. Hassan, 149 Iowa 518, 128 N. W. 960 (1910) ; State v. Taylor,
118 Mo. 153, 24 S. W. 449 (1893) ; see also People v. Fong Ah Sing, 64 Cal.
253, 28 Pac. 233 (1883), where a charge in effect that defendant was not to
have the benefit of any doubt in regard to the alleged alibi, unless the jury
should find as a fact that he was at a place other than the place of shooting at
the time of shooting, was held to be error.
25 State v. Taylor, 118 Mo. 153, 24 S. W. 449 (1893) ; Beck v. State, 51
Neb. 106, 70 N. W. 498 (1897) ; Burns v. State, 75 Ohio St. 407, 79 N. E. 929
(1907).
26 State v. Nelson, 17 N. D. 13, 114 N. W. 478 (1908).
27 People v. Stone, 117 N. Y. 480, 23 N. E. 13 (1889) ; cf. Pellum v. State,
89 Ala. 28, 8 So. 83 (1890), where a charge to the jury to the effect that defendant must reasonably satisfy the jury as to alibi was approved.
28 People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1936).
29 Ibid.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 16

New York County Lawyer's Association for the American Bar Association drew up a bill which was similar to the alibi notice statute in
Ohio 30 and Michigan. 8' Thereafter, with amendments suggested by
the Association of Grand Jurors of New York County, the bill was
introduced in the legislature and enacted into law, becoming effective
July 1, 1935.32 The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Ohio statute is constitutional.38 In Michigan no direct attack has been made
upon the alibi statute; however, it has been considered and approved.8 4
In New York, the Queens County Court upheld the constitutionality
of Section 295(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.8 5 It has not
yet appeared before the New York Court of Appeals.
The prosecutors of the State of New York felt that the day of
the sudden alibi witnesses had vanished due to the requirement put
on the accused to give notice of intention to use alibi witnesses to
prosecutor, upon the latter's request.8 6 Then on October 31, 1940,
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, held that
the alibi statute does not apply to the testimony of the defendant, but
only to the testimony of other witnesses produced for the purpose of
giving evidence upon the question of alibi.8 7 Thus the door is again
opened to the sudden appearance of an alibi defense. 8 It is true that
30

OHIO GEN. CODE § 13444-20, 113, v. 190, c. 23, § 20.

31 Comp'. LAWS MICH~.
32

(1929) §§ 17313, 17314.

bN. Y. CODE OF CM. PROC. § 295(1) (In all cases where a defendant has
been indicted by a grand jury, the prosecuting officer may, not less than eight
days before the case is moved for trial, serve upon such defendant or his counsel
and file a demand which shall require that if such defendant intend to offer, for
any purpose whatever, testimony which may tend to establish his presence
elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he must
within four days thereafter serve upon such prosecuting officer and file a bill of
particulars which shall set forth in detail the place or places where the defendant claims to have been, together with the names, post-office addresses, residences and places of employment of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely
to establish his presence elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission. Unless the defendant shall, pursuant to such demand, serve
and file such a bill of particulars, the court, in the event that such testimony is
sought to be interposed by the defendant upon the trial for any purpose whatever, or in the event that a witness not mentioned in such bill of particulars is
called by the defendant to give such testimony, may exclude such testimony or
the testimony of such witness. In the event that the court shall allow such
testimony or the testimony of such witness, it must upon motion of the prosecuting officer, grant an adjournment not to exceed three days).
33 In State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931), it was said
in reference to the Ohio alibi statute, "It gives the state some protection against
false and fraudulent claims of alibi often presented by the accused so near the
close of the trial as to make it impossible for the state to ascertain any facts as
to the credibility of the witnesses called by the accused, who may reside at
some point far distant from the place of trial.
34 People v. Marcus, 253 Mich. 410, 235 N. W. 202 (1931).
35 People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1936).
36 N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. § 295(1).
37 People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (3d Dep't
1940) ; (1941) 15 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 304.
38 People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (3d Dep't
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the defendant's own testimony may be partially disregarded by the
jury when there are no witnesses to substantiate it, but only a reasonable doubt is required for an acquittal to follow,8 9 and the defendant's
prevarications may induce such reasonable doubt. The need for a
new statute requiring defendant to give notice if he himself intends
to testify as to his presence elsewhere is apparent. The objection to
this is that failure to give such notice would prevent the defendant
from having a fair trial 40 by denying him his right to testify in his
own behalf.41 But, the defendant would still have a fair trial for
there is no denial of his right to testify in his own behalf. All that
would be required is that he give notice of his intention to use alibi
evidence. The loophole in the present statute could be removed by
making the following amendment to the present statute: "* * * This
act shall apply to defendant's own testimony. But if the defendant
fail to serve and file a bill of particulars as to his own testimony, the
court, in the event that such testimony is sought to be interposed by
the defendant upon the trial, shall not exclude such testimony, but
must, upon motion of the prosecuting officer, grant an adjournment
not to exceed three days."
With this act in hand, the prosecution may again go forward in
its fight against crime prepared to meet any contingency and without
fear of a sudden, unaccounted for and unforeseen alibi defense.
ARTHUR MARCHIANO.

1940), dissenting opinion of Bliss, J.: "Section 295(1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is very broad and by its plain terms prevents a defendant as well as
other witnesses in his behalf from testifying to his presence elsewhere unless
he has given a bill of particulars when demanded by the prosecuting officer.
The statute makes no exception when the defendant himself offers to testify to
the alibi. There is nothing in the statute which would prevent a defendant or
other witnesses from testifying that he was not at the scene of the crime.
However, if he desires to prove his presence elsewhere at the time the crime
was committed and the district attorney has served the demand mentioned in
the statute, then the defendant must follow the procedure outlined in the
statute before he may give such testimony. The statute relates only to the
procedure to be followed in advance of the trial. A defendant by following
such procedure, may prove an alibi by himself or others. There has been no
deprivation of a substantive right. Although the statute by its own terms
provides otherwise, the majority are about to read into it an exception to the
effect that it does not apply when a defendant himself offers to testify to the
alibi. I feel that we have no recourse other than to accept the law as written."
39 People v. Wells, 10 Cal. 610, 76 P. (2d) 493 (1938) ; State v. Carver,
213 N. C. 150, 195 S. E. 349 (1938) ; Simpson v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. 303, 247
S. W. 548 (1923); 16 C. J. 775, n.65.
40 "A fair trial is a legal trial conducted according to the rules of common
law except so far as it has been changed by statute and one wherein legal rights
of the accused are safeguarded and respected." Universal Adjustment Corp. v.
Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152 (1933) ; Johnson v. City of
Wildwood, 116 N. J. L. 462, 184 Atl. 616 (1936).
41 People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (3d Dep't
1940); (1941) 15 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 304.

